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Abstract. This article provides commentary on how a government purporting to be representative
democracy might best approach the construct of collateral damage.
The construct of collateral damage often denotes unintended and undesired death, destruction, and
damage effected by military intervention. It is the unintended and undesired death of humans that is
most often a focus of public discourse.
Some observers posit that the very construct of collateral damage is indicative of reverence for human
life and of humane compassion and intention. Moreover, it is posited that such reverence, compassion,
and intention can most often translate into less unintended and undesired death, destruction, and
damage.
However, other observers posit that the construct necessarily induces a dehumanization of the
construct’s proponents. This dehumanization is elaborated as viewing targets of military intervention-intended or unintended, desired or undesired--as less than human. A posited logical consequence is
more death, destruction, and damage of all kinds. Another consequence is assumed to be the lowering
of the threshold for war and other military interventions.
This latter stance that links collateral damage to dehumanization intrinsically manifests a basic selfcontradiction. For proponents of this stance are left with the conundrum of asserting that the very use
of the term is harmful even as they are asserting to be employing the term in a non-harmful manner.
The differential self-privileging of the benign and other-demonizing of the malignant are often not made
explicit and, in any case, cannot be easily defended by common epistemological approaches.
Nevertheless, one might still seek to develop a stance on collateral damage for the government of a selfprofessed representative democracy. And if the government, indeed, approaches in the concrete the
abstract principles of a representative democracy--and if democratic values are based on common
notions of human and civil rights and liberties, the integrity of the individual and larger groupings, and
the sanctity or reified secular privileging of human life--this stance might actually serve as a behavioral
guidon.
It might seem easiest to advance a moral rationale based on highly valued personal behavior and an
ethical rationale based on highly valued behavior in social roles such as those of political and military
leaders and followers. Not only would these rationales be consistent with what is deemed worthy of
compliance by the sort of representative democracy described above, but they also would provide a
self-reinforcing nature leading to greater cognitive, emotional, and behavioral congruence and
compliance.
It might seem most difficult to advance a national strategic rationale supporting the espousal of and
compliance with minimizing what is commonly denoted by the construct of collateral damage. This is
because supporters of both the political and military objectives related to a conflict wherein military
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force is to be employed might deem minimizing collateral damage to be but a needless constraint--and a
very possible impediment to political and military success.
However, there are strategic benefits to minimizing collateral damage. First, a forthright attempt to
minimize collateral damage can yield less relevant data for adversary propaganda assets to exploit.
Second, the forthright attempt also can support and further one’s own national values that are desired
to be transmitted and accepted internationally. Third, the forthright attempt can increase the
probability that others may accept one’s political and military case in the conflict--with the assumption
that these others do, indeed, embrace the goal of minimizing collateral damage. Following from the
third benefit, one might find more allies and less adversaries during the conflict and in the important
military aftermath.
Based on these benefits, it would behoove the military establishment of a government purporting to be
a representative democracy to carry out ongoing research on how to effect a minimization of collateral
damage much as it would already be engaging in research about optimal methods of death, destruction,
and damage. Part of the collateral damage research would involve data collection and analysis during
war and about wars of the past. The result might be a future with less casualties who are innocent in a
world wherein no one may be innocent and wherein a world with and at war may never have had
innocence to lose. (See Eviatar, D. (March 22, 2003). Civilian toll: A moral and legal bog. The New York
Times, pp. A17, A19; Finlay, B., & Love, G.D. (1998). Gender differences in reasoning about military
intervention. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 22, 481-485; Geneva Conventions.
http://www.redcross.lv/en/conventions.htm; Kelman, H.C. (1995). Decision making and public
discourse in the Gulf War: An assessment of underlying psychological and moral assumptions. Peace &
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 1, 117-130; Kirkland, F.R. (1996). Psychological purposes served
by war: Three perspectives. Journal of Psychohistory, 24, 53-63; Linn, R. (1996). The emergence of
Holocaust memories in the moral dilemmas of objecting Israeli soldiers during the Intifada. Social
Behavior & Personality, 24, 133-141.) (Keywords: Collateral Damage, Ethics, Morality, War.)
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